A failure effects simulation of a low authority flight control augmentation system on a UH-1H helicopter by Talbot, P. D. & Corliss, L. D.
NASA TECHNICAL NASA TM-73,258
MEMORANDUM
8
CM
CO*
A FAILURE EFFECTS SIMULATION OF A LOW AUTHORITY FLIGHT
CONTROL AUGMENTATION SYSTEM ON A UH-1H HELICOPTER
Lloyd D. Corliss and Peter D Talbot
Ames Research Center
and
Ames Directorate
U.S Army Air Mobility R&D Laboratory
Moffett Field, California 94035
August 1977
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19770024230 2020-03-22T07:28:27+00:00Z
NOTATION
lateral pilot control input, rad
longitudinal pilot control input, rad
h helicopter rate of climb
Pg body axis roll rate, rad/sec
qg body axis pitch rate, rad/sec
rg body axis yaw rate, rad/sec
Ug x-body axis inertial velocity, ft/sec, m/sec
UQ longitudinal component of relative wind in wind control axis
system, ft/sec, m/sec
UA1'UB1»UTR control commands to actuators, rad/sec2
UQ control command to actuator, ft/sec2, m/sec2
Vg y-body axis inertial velocity, ft/sec, m/sec
Wg z-body axis inertial velocity, ft/sec, m/sec
<$a pilot's lateral stick displacement, in., cm
6C pilot's collective stick displacement, in., cm
<$e pilot's longitudinal stick displacement, in., cm
6_ pilot's pedal displacement, in., cm
8 aircraft pitch altitude Euler angle
9Q main rotor collective pitch
e^ jj tail rotor collective pitch
<(> aircraft roll attitude
fy aircraft heading
center-and-lock time constant, sec
monitor delay time, sec
amplitude of total cyclic pitch control input, rad
AX longitudinal displacement of helicopter following servo failure, ft, m
AY lateral displacement of helicopter following servo failure, ft, m
Ah height loss of helicopter following servo failure, ft, m
Subscripts
TR tail rotor
VF vertical fin
HS horizontal stabilizer
1C inertial conditions - trimmed conditions for the helicopter
m model
li
NOTATIONS FOR APPENDIX B
initial conditions (I.C.) of simulator x,y,z
x,y, z
,„ ,_. _ simulator x,y,z commands (including I.C.)x, y, z
simulator drive accelerations used in the calculation of load
factors along x,y,z axes
Ac desired simulator x,y,z (excluding I.C.)
x,y, z
AS desired simulator x,y,z
x, y, z
ATS equivalent translational acceleration along x,y,z axes
x,y, z
AFU IT , simulator position (from cab or computer) along x,y,z axesx, y, z
Ax}y)Z calculated earth axes accelerations at the pilot station along
x,y,z axes (inputs to high-pass filter)
AQU output of high-pass filter (multiplied by gains Ki ) along
X
'
y
'
Z
 x,y,z axes x'y'z
APM gravitational accelerations, due to cab residual tilt, along
x,y, z
x,y,z axes
AMLX)y>z limits of x,y,z
AMLY „ „ limits of x,y,zx, y, z
AMLX v , limits of x,y,zx,y, z
a . initial conditions (I.C.) of simulator 4>,6,ij;
. simulator <j>,9,i^ commands (including I.C.)
>o»V
Aq, _ . desired simulator <f>,9,\J>
<P.9,i()
AA Q ^ calculated body axes accelerations at the pilot station along
<j>,9,i|; (input to high-pass filter)
AN output of high-pass filter (multiplied by gains KI ) along
<p,9
•.Q,'!' of simulator cab from high-pass filter
>,9 due to residual cab tilt
•
>,9 due to residual cab tilt
111
AML,.
 n ,,, limits of
limits of
g acceleration due to gravity
Kx,y,z washout gains for x,y,z axes
KLLV w l°w frequency gains, residual tilt for x,y axesx
»y
KQ gains for modifying calculated gravitational acceleration compo-
nents corresponding to residual tilt, for x,y,z axes
KN gains for modifying the contribution of the gravitational
x
»
y
»
z
 accelerations to the required simulator translational acceler-
ations for x,y,z axes
K* 9 d, washout gains in 4>,3,i{> axes
TMij transformation between cab fixed axes and earth fixed axes
(i,j=l,2,3)
x,y,z cab position relative to earth fixed axes - also used to desig-
nate translational axes
H^^ j •> * high-pass washout filter damping factors for x,y,z axesTCi,yi, zi
(i-1,2)
CH high-pass washout filter damping factors for <b,Q,ty axes
"
CD long term filter damping factors, for x,y,z axes
x,y, z
Cx y load factors along x,y axes
CLLX y load factors contributions to be produced by residual tilt
U>H . high-pass washout filter undamped frequencies for x,y,z axes
xi,yi,zi
(1-1,2)
am,. Q . . high-pass washout filter undamped frequencies for <t>,6,i|> axes
(i = l,2)
WD long term filter undamped frequencies for x,y,z axes
x,y, z
IDT factors used in residual tilt calculationsux,y
gains multiplying the contribution to the required <|>,6,<|; of
the error between cab position and required residual tilt
IV
<J>,0,iJi Euler angles used to orient the cab relative to earth fixed axes.
Euler angle sequency is $,9,^ . Also used to designate roll,
pitch and yaw axes, respectively, for both aircraft body axes and
simulator axes
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SUMMARY
A two-pilot moving base simulator experiment was conducted to assess the
effects of servo failures of a flight control system on the transient dynamics
of a Bell UH-1H helicopter. The flight control hardware considered was part
of the V/STOLAND system built by Sperry with control authorities of from
20-40%. Servo hardover and oscillatory failures were simulated in each
control axis. Measurements were made to determine the adequacy of the fail-
ure monitoring system time delay and the servo center and lock time constant,
the pilot reaction times, and the altitude and attitude excursions of the
helicopter at hover and 60 knots.
Safe recoveries were made from all failures under VFR conditions. Pilot
reaction times were from 0.5 to 0.75 sec. Reduction of monitor delay times
below these values resulted in significantly reduced excursion envelopes.
A subsequent flight test was conducted on a UH-1H helicopter with the
V/STOLAND system installed. Series servo hardovers were introduced in hover
and at 60 knots straight and level. Data from these tests are included for
comparison.
INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of this simulation was to assess the recovery char-
acteristics of a given helicopter subjected to a single axis failure of a low
authority (20-40%) control augmentation system with mechanical backup. For
the simulation, a UH-1H helicopter was modeled (ref. 1) with an augmentation
system of parallel and series actuators. The flight control hardware was of
the type being installed on a UH-1H at Ames as part of the V/STOLAND research
flight system, and is similar in its actuator installation to several previous
experimental systems (e.g., HOWAC, ALARMS, and HENILAS). A desired outcome
of this study was to determine safe altitude-airspeed operating limits in the
event of failure of the augmentation system.
This simulation required a two-pilot operation with a research pilot
handing off control to the safety pilot during the failure. Since motion cues
are important when assessing the severity of the failure, the safety pilot
(recovery pilot) was situated in a single place six-degree-of-freedom motion
simulator. The research pilot was located in a fixed-base simulator which was
deemed suitable since he serves no role after the failure is introduced. Both
pilots were in voice communication with each other and were presented with the
same visual scene.
The failures simulated were single axis failures which resulted in either
an oscillatory or hardover motion of the series actuator resulting in uncom-
manded movement of the control to the main rotor or tail rotor.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Helicopter Control System
The flight control hardware modelled for this simulation represented the
V/STOLAND control system. The V/STOLAND system is an integrated navigation,
guidance and flight control system, to be used on a UH-1H helicopter for con-
ducting in-flight simulation. Elements of this system are shown in figure 1.
The left-hand seat is designated as the research or evaluation side while the
right-hand seat is the safety pilot side and its controls will remain essen-
tially as a basic UH-1H.
The flight control portion of the V/STOLAND system is one which utilizes
a combination of a parallel and a series actuator in the linkage of each con-
trol. Both actuators are driven by the control laws as programmed in the
onboard 1819B digital computer. Functionally, the series actuators, which are
limited in authority (approximately 20-40%), are the faster responding actua-
tors and thus act primarily on the transient behavior. The parallel actuators,
are full authority rate servos which act to off-load the series servos and
thus provide a trimming function. Control schematics of the cyclic, pedal,
and collective servo installation are shown in figures 2, 3, and 4, respec-
tively. One additional hardware element of the V/STOLAND control system is a
disconnect device on the research stick which allows that stick to operate in
a fly-by-wire mode. As indicated above, all flight control experiments will
be flown from the left seat and thus in the event of a system malfunction or
failure, control will revert to the right-hand seat. It is this area, that is,
the effects on vehicle dynamics under a fail condition and the hand-off of
control from the research pilot to the safety pilot, that this simulation
addressed.
Potential System Failures
An integral part of the V/STOLAND system is a safety monitor system.
When a malfunction is detected (which in many cases results in a hardover
command) the monitor will disengage the servos after a prescribed time delay
and annunciate the failure to both pilots. The monitor time delay, which was
a variable in this study is of the order of 1 sec or less.
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For initial consideration, there are three types of servo responses to
system failures, hardover, fixed, and oscillatory. Some of the typical
causes of such failures are described below.
System Failure Hardover Fixed Oscillatory
Data adapter or computer X X
Analog commands to servos X X
Loss of stick sensors X
Loss of pedal or collective sensor X
Loss of rate gyros X
Loss of attitude gyros X
Servo failure X X X
A particular variant of the hardover failure worthy of comment is the
ramping or drifting servo. While this type of failure along with the fixed
failure present their own subtle problems, they do not result in the abrupt
transient vehicle motion which is characteristic of the hardover and oscilla-
tory failures. For this reason they were not pursued in this simulation.
In addition to these specific objectives, the simulation had the general
objective of familiarizing the pilots with the V/STOLAND system, its failure
modes, and general procedures during failure and hand-off of control from the
research pilot to the safety pilot.
Piloting Tasks and Flight Conditions
Two flight conditions were chosen as representative for evaluation of the
failures: 60 knots level flight cruise and hover out-of-ground effect.
The hover condition is critical because it represents a maximum power
condition (maximum collective pitch) with attendant maximum left pedal require-
ment in the steady-state, prefailure trim condition. Thus, control margins
for collective pitch and pedal available for recovery are a minimum in this
situation.
The 60-knot cruise condition is not critical from a control margin stand-
point but is a typical flight speed for the UH-1H, corresponding to the mini-
mum power required point of a speed-power required curve. Landing approach
and climbout after takeoff are conducted at about 60 knots. Maneuvers for NOE
flight are typically flown in the 40 to 60-knot speed range. Therefore, fail-
ure excursions data obtained at 60 knots is likely to be of general benefit to
users conducting experiments in these flight regimes.
For the hover task, the helicopter was trimmed in the hover condition at
8700 Ib (38,698 N^gross weight. The research pilot was instructed to lift-
off and climb above a line of trees immediately in front of the helicopter,
gradually bringing the helicopter to a stable hover about the tree line. Some
freedom was given to the research pilot to make small maneuvers (pedal turns,
lateral translations) when a steady hover altitude, immediately above the tree
line, was reached.
SIMULATION TEST PLAN
General Description of Simulation
The requirement in this experiment was to simulate single failures of
elements in the research control system of the UH-1H helicopter during a typi-
cal flight task. Such a task involves a research pilot flying an augmented
version of the helicopter from the left seat, while a safety pilot monitors
the aircraft from the right seat. Should a failure of one of the servos occur
during flight, it is the job of the safety pilot to assume control and make a
recovery. Normally, such failures will be detected and displayed to the pilot
through V/STOLAND safety monitoring system; however, the pilot may detect the
failure first, from motion and visual cues. Any lead time available to the
safety pilot from these cues is important, because it hastens the recovery
action and minimizes the perturbations to the helicopter. The use of a motion
base simulator was therefore necessary for a realistic evaluation of the
safety pilot's ability to detect the failures. The motion simulator for this
experiment was a single seat, six-degree-of-freedom simulator which incorpo-
rated a black and white TV monitor. Motion washout was used to keep the cab
excursions within its physical limits. To simulate two-pilot operation, it
was necessary to situate the research pilot in a second, fixed-base simulator
remotely located from the first. Both pilots were in voice contact and were
presented with the same visual scene of a terrain model. Figure 5 shows the
overall setup for this simulation.
The software for this all-digital simulation included the basic UH-1H
helicopter (ref. 1), the flight control augmentation and the servo actuator
complex (appendix A), and the failure logic. The flight control scheme was a
prefliter model following type. The helicopter was flown in the augmented
mode by the research pilot in the fixed-base simulator until the failure to a
servo actuator was introduced. In the actual aircraft, the safety pilot always
has a direct connection to the aircraft controls. In the simulation, however,
the logic was designed so that the safety pilot's inputs were ignored by the
computer until the moment when the failure was introduced. At any time after
that, the safety pilot had control of the aircraft.
Each failure was introduced to one series servo at a time as either a
servo oscillation or a servo hardover. All other seven servos, both series
and parallel, continued to function normally for a period of time correspond-
ing to the "time-delay" phase of the V/STOLAND monitoring system. "Normal
functioning" in the simulation was generally evidenced by rapid movements of
the good servos attempting to correct for the upset of the aircraft introduced
by the failed servo.
At the end of the time delay phase, typically one second, all series
servos, including the failed servo, begin to go to center-and-lock position,
the research pilot's inputs no longer have any effect on the controls, the
parallel servos are frozen and the panel warning light goes on. The series
servos are essentially in their center positions after one center-and-lock
time constant (typically three seconds). The sequence is illustrated
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Figure 5.- Simulator setup.
schematically in figure 6 showing the position of a failed series servo
during a hardover failure.
The model flown by the safety pilot did not fully revert to the unaug-
mented UH-1H model until the end of the center-and-lock period of the servos.
The pilot generally was able to detect that a failure had occurred before this
time by available motion and visual cues.
All pilots were given some familiarization time in the moving base simu-
lator prior to obtaining the data. This familiarization consisted of undi-
rected flying at hover and 60 knots of the unaugmented helicopter and of the
augmented helicopter with announced failures. All failures given for the data
runs were unannounced failures.
Test Objectives
The test objectives were: (1) to determine if the failure criteria time
delays, and the servo center-and-lock time constant of the Sperry specifica-
tion (ref. 2) were adequate, (2) to determine the altitude, horizontal posi-
tion, and angular excursions associated with normal failures, so as to define
safe operating margins when flying with the system, (3) to measure pilot reac-
tion time to the failures, and (4) to measure rotor flapping excursions during
the failures.
A single axis failure was then given to the pilot at the discretion of
the experimenter. Control reverted to the safety pilot in the motion simula-
tor, who then made the recovery.
For the forward flight task, the helicopter was trimmed in an initial
condition at 60 knots, flying along a line of hills and toward the crest of
one particular hill. The research pilot was instructed to track a line of
white disks delineating a slowly curving ground track. Very precise tracking
was not required. Failures were then initiated at the discretion of the
experimenter, either in level trimmed flight or in moderate (below 30° bank
angle) turns.
In both flight tasks, the physical terrain features were intended to
provide some reference for the safety pilot as he made his recovery, so that
excursions would not be unrealistically large due to the single factor of
having no readily available position and attitude cues.
Instructions to the safety pilot were to bring the helicopter to an
unaccelerated flight condition and arrest sink rate as quickly as possible
following his detection of the failure from motion or visual cues. He was
permitted to track the cyclic stick with his hand during the prefailure
flight condition. Both pilots actually could make inputs to the helicopter
during the "time delay" phase (fig. 6) of the failure sequence, however, the
research pilot was instructed to relinquish control as soon as he detected the
failure, and his controls became inoperative after the monitor time delay
phase.
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Recovery criteria.- Following a failure from a nominally unaccelerated
flight condition, the helicopter was recovered by the safety pilot. In ana-
lyzing the failure records, three recovery criteria were considered:
(1) recovery to an unaccelerated flight condition, (2) recovery to zero rate
of climb, and (3) pilot's assessment of recovery.
A truly unaccelerated flight condition in all axes was seldom achieved
before a run was ended by the pilot. Therefore, the acceleration criterion
for recovery was not used in evaluation of the data. In practice, the pilot's
remark ("I have recovered" or "I have control") was sufficiently delayed that
the maximum excursions in attitude and position of the helicopter had been
attained, including arresting the sink rate to zero. Therefore, this crite-
rion was considered appropriate.
Displacements of the helicopter center of gravity following a servo fail-
ure were calculated based on an earth-fixed reference system. At the instant
of failure, an axis system was frozen with axes as follows (fig. 7).
origin aircraft center of gravity at instant of failure
X axis parallel to earth and lying in the aircraft plane of symmetry
Y axis parallel to earth and normal to the X-axis
h axis normal to X and Y axes
All helicopter excursions (X, Y, and h) were then computed in this system.
For failures occurring at 60 knots, the X displacements have no significance.
Test plan.- The tests were divided into two general groups: (1) evalua-
tion of hardover failures of the series servos and (2) evaluation of oscilla-
tory failures of the series servos.
Within the hardover failure group, there were two system variables evalu-
ated - the time delay TJJ of the failed servo and the center-and-lock time
constant TQL of all servos, including the failed servo.
Within the oscillatory failure group, there are no additional system
variables to be considered. The servos were allowed to oscillate at their
natural frequency, a failure resulting from loss of the damping feedback term
to the servo.
The scope of the tests is shown in table 1.
All of the test conditions were flown with the simulator cab enclosed and
with washed-out cab motion. Some preliminary runs for the hover case were
made without washout - that is, the ratio of cab motion to calculated aircraft
motions was one - and the simulator cab was opened to surrounding scene.
These runs were useful for general familiarization and evaluation of moving
base handling qualities of the model, but many failures at one-to-one motion
resulted in overloading and cutout of the motion drive system. Therefore,
motion washout was a necessity in these tests.
12
Figure 7.- Axis system for computing displacements after a failure.
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TABLE 1.- SCOPE OF TEST PLAN.
Number of pilots 4
Types of failures Hardovers, single axis
Oscillatory, single axis
Monitor time delay, sec 0.25, 0.50, 1.0,a 5.0
Center-and-lock 3.0,a 1.0, 0.5
time constant, sec
Axes Collective - UP, DN
Pitch - UP, DN
Roll - L, R
Yaw - L, R
Flight conditions Hover, 60 knots
Gross weight, 8700 Ib (38,698 N)
*»
Standard value
For selected axes, either the monitor time delay or the center-and-lock
time constant was varied while holding the other characteristic at its stand-
ard value. The values were changed in sequential runs so that the pilot could
make direct comparisons.
RESULTS
The data collected from this simulation will be discussed under five
classifications: hardover failures at hover, hardover failures at 60 knots,
oscillatory failures, effects of monitor delay times, and effects of servo
center-and-lock time. In each case maximum excursions in 8, <j>, X, Y and h
were recorded. These maximum occurred sometime between the introduction of
the failure and the annunciation by the pilot that he had control (usually
within 5 to 7 sec). Also recorded was the rotor flapping angle.
The quasi-static rotor flapping equations used permitted only a steady-
state estimation of the flapping during a servo hardover failure.
The results show that the limit flapping value of 12° was not reached in
any of the runs. Peak values of 8° occurred in the roll and collective down
hardover failures at 60 knots. Flapping values were generally higher at
60 knots than in hover. Subsequent tests in flight showed that the measured
flapping values agreed well with the simulated values in hover and were gener-
ally less than the simulated values in forward flight. While the flight tests
were brief and some of the conditions varied from those of the simulation, the
comparison does show the rotor equations to be a useful representation.
Prior co each data run the pilots were asked co "fly" the simulation of
the unaugmented UH-1H from 60 knots to hover. Generally the pilot agreed the
simulation was more difficult to fly near hover than the real helicopter.
Primarily, the pilots indicated that the simulation didn't feel as well damped
in pitch and roll as the real helicopter. A comparison between the responses
or the model and response data of a UH-1H in flight may be found in
reference 1.
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Hardover Failures at Hover
Single axis failures were introduced randomly and unannounced from a
loiter position at approximately 100 ft (30.5 m) altitude. The visual cues
during this phase were provided by conifer type trees in the foreground and
rolling terrain in the background as displayed on a single uncollimated black
and white TV monitor The most frequent complaint with this type of presenta-
tion was related to the limited field of view available (38° vertical by 48°
horizontal), particularly when performing a hovering task.
Table 2(a) summarizes the hover hardover failure data. Each pilot was
given each of the eight failures at least once resulting in a total of from
6 to 13 runs per failure. Shown on table 2(a) are the dispersions of the maxi-
mum values of each parameter over all the runs as well as the average of those
maximum values.
Based on pilot commentary during the tests, the more severe failures were
pitch-up and yaw in either direction. However, the severity in the pitch-up
failure was due, in part, to the loss in the visual scene because of the
limited field of view TV monitor. During the yaw failures the pilot expressed
a concern over the remaining margin available in the directional controls.
This limited control margin inhibited the pilots' ability to arrest the yaw
rates.
By referring to table 2(a), it can be seen that for all failures except
collective, the pilot reaction times were generally from 0.5 to 0.7 sec. In
collective, however, the reaction times were longer. This longer reaction
time is consistent with pilot commentary regarding the difficulty he had in
detecting some of the collective failures.
Following this simulation, a brief flight test of servo hardovers was
performed using the V/STOLAND hardware on a UH-1H helicopter. The hover hard-
over tests were conducted at an altitude of 15-25 ft (4 5-7.6 m) and the
results are shown for comparison on table 2(b). Unlike the simulation, the
flight failures were announced hardovers and subject to a monitor time delay
of 0.5 sec. This monitor time is a reduction from the 1.0 sec originally pro-
posed for the V/STOLAND system (ref. 2) and used for the simulator study.
Even with these differences the data on table 2(b) shows a reasonable correla-
tion with table 2(a) both in magnitude and trend.
Hardover Failures at 60 Knots
The 60 knot failures were introduced while the pilot was flying a marked
track over irregular rolling terrain. His nominal altitude was between
50-200 ft (15.2-61 m).
Table 3(a) shows a summary of the 60 knot failure data. As with the
hover data the pilot reaction times (except for collective) were of the order
of 0.5 to 0.7 sec. The pitch-up and yaw failures were again considered by the
pilots to be the more severe. The roll failures, particularly left roll, were
considered to be severe but manageable.
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TABLE 2.- HARDOVER DATA AT HOVER
Failure e,deg
*.
deg
AX
ft m
AY
ft m
Height loss
ft m
Pilot
reaction
Rotor
flapping
Number
of runs
(a) Simulation
Pitch dn
Pitch up
Coll. dn
Coll. up
Roll rt.
Roll It.
Yaw rt.
Yaw It.
22
10 15
32
 Q
4 19
12
0 5
n
 s
"2 5
]5 „
"5 U
I5- a
4 8
9 ,
2 5
6 ,
0 4
Pitch dn
Pitch up
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Coll. up
Roll rt.
Roll It.
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Yaw It.
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9
10
8
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9
7
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o 4
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29 „
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2 J
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1
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(b) Flight
5
2
14
0
0
0
0
0
1.5
0.61
4.3
0
0
0
0
0
3.6
5.3
2.4
2.8
3.5
7.2
2.5
2.0
Key:
Largest maximum value
22
To"15' •Averaged value
'Smallest maximum value
TABLE 3.- HARDOVER DATA AT 60 KNOTS
Failure 6,deg
*,
deg
AX
ft m
AY
ft m
Height loss
ft m
Pilot
reaction
Rotor
flapping
Number
of runs
(a) Simulation
Pitch dn
Pitch up
Coll. dn
Coll. up
Roll rt.
Roll It.
Yaw rt.
Yaw It.
16
 1f)
4 10
35
1 1J
16
 10
5 10
22
2 8
18
 n
4 10
12
 R
4 °
14
3 7
12 -
0 J
16 Q
3 9
18
2 13
23
5 U
27
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Again for comparison, the flight data for 60 knot straight and level
series servo hardovers are shown on table 3(b). These results were for
announced failures and a monitor time delay of 0.5 sec. A comparison with the
simulation data of table 3(a) shows a good correlation in trend, however, the
simulation data resulted in consistently higher flapping angles.
Figure 8 depicts the failure envelope which is a summary of the average
of the maximum values for the hover and 60 knot simulation data. While this
envelope cannot be considered as absolute it does indicate the likely excur-
sions for a single failure.
Oscillatory Failures
The oscillatory failures were introduced at 60 knots as undamped servo
responses at 10 Hz. This frequency is typical of actuators used in control
augmentation applications. In all cases, these failures were considered mild
in terms of their effects on the handling qualities of the vehicle. A summary
of these failures is given in table 4. The detection of such failures by the
pilot often occurred only through system annunciation. This is indicated by
the rather long pilot reaction times shown in table 4. Of interest for fur-
ther study would be to determine if a lower frequency of oscillation would be
objectionable.
Effects of Monitor Delay Time
One of the more generally applicable phases of this simulation was one
which considered varying TD, the system failure detection time. The failure
detection time is the time from the onset of a failure to the time when the
system detects the failure and disengages. Disengagement in this case implies
the reversion to the unaugmented mode and centering and locking of the series
servos. A failure detection (or monitor) time delay is often a variable and
is usually made long enough to avoid transients or nuisance disconnects and
yet short enough to provide some aid to the recovery from a real failure. An
important fact regarding this time is the pilot's own reaction time; that is,
if the pilot can react faster than the monitor in disengaging the system, then
the monitor time may be too long and serve little function in the recovery
from a failure. Conversely, a monitor time which is consistently shorter than
the pilot's reaction time, will help reduce the failure excursion envelope.
The baseline monitor time used in this simulation was 1 sec and as can be seen
from tables 2 and 3 this was generally longer than the pilot's own reaction
time.
The results of variations in the monitor time from 0.25 to 5 sec for a
roll hardover failure at 60 knots are shown on table 5. Note that for the
monitor times of 0.5 and 0.25 sec, the average <|> and Y excursions were sig-
nificantly smaller. Also, note that in most cases the average pilot reaction
time was of the order of 0.5 sec. This time was also noted for both the hover
and 60 knot roll data on tables 2(a) and 3(a). Such data imply an upper bound
of useful monitor time of around 0.5 sec, and that a reduction from that value
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SINGLE; HARDOVER FAILURE ENVELOPE:
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Figure 8.- Failure effects simulation results.
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TABLE 5.- EFFECTS OF MONITOR DELAY TIME AT 60 KNOTS
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can help reduce the excursion envelope. Pilot commentary for the test runs at
0.25 sec further supported these results. The pilots reported that, for this
monitor time, failures were very mild or even undetectable (i.e., detected
only through the annunciator light on the panel). Establishing a lower bound
for monitor time (i.e., one at which nuisance disconnects begin to occur
"frequently") would be somewhat more tenuous. No attempt was made in this
simulation to determine this bound, however, previous experience with other
systems indicates that around 0.1 sec such disconnects do occur.
In summary, it appears that in cases where minimizing the failure excur-
sion is of prime importance (e.g., flying close to the ground), then a monitor
time of 0.25 sec or less should be considered.
Center-and-Lock Time
The last phase of this simulation considered variations in the centering
and locking time of a failed series servo. The center-and-lock function is a
built-in feature of certain series servos and results in a motion of the con-
trol linkages while centering occurs. The intent of this part of the study
was to determine whether the rate at which the centering occurs could conflict
with the pilots own control inputs. Table 6 shows the results of variations
in the center-and-lock time for a pitch failure at 60 knots. The pilot commen-
tary for this sequence was somewhat mixed, however, all four pilots tended to
favor the faster center-and-lock time of 0.5 sec. It was interesting to note
that one pilot found the 1 sec centering time conflicted with his own control
corrections, causing overshoot in the vehicles motion. This perhaps indicates
a centering time which was approaching the pilot's own natural time constant.
The data show no marked trend for variations in the centering time.
CONCLUSIONS
1. No failures produced a flight condition from which recovery was not
possible. The maximum altitude loss seen in any failure was 100 ft (30.5 m),
however, that was for a case when the pilot was not constrained by low
altitude flight.
2. Pilot reaction time to most hardover failures was from 0.5 to
0.75 sec.
3. Reducing the monitor time to below 0.5 sec significantly reduced the
hardover failure excursion envelope. Where minimizing the excursion is of
prime importance, a monitor time of 0.25 sec or less should be considered.
4. A wide variation in center-and-lock time following a failure had
little effect on the pilot's recovery. There is a range of center-and-lock
time around 1 sec which causes overshoot, perhaps because of the proximity to
the pilot's time constant.
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TABLE 6.- EFFECTS OF CENTER-AND-LOCK TIME
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5. The pilots considered the oscillatory failures to be very mild.
6. Calculated rotor flapping excursions were well within flapping limits;
however, more detailed analysis or substantiating flight test is warranted.
7. Excursions from announced hardovers during flight tests showed
reasonable correlation with the simulator results.
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APPENDIX A
CONTROL SYSTEM MODEL
The control system software for this simulation was a prefilter model
follower type. This system was flown from the fixed-based simulator and was
the mode to which all failures were introduced. Since the intent of this simu-
lation was to evaluate the recovery from a failure, no major effect was made
to optimize the control system. Rather, the characteristics chosen for the
model follower represented "good" handling qualities as determined from a pre-
vious simulation (ref. 3). For pitch and roll the model selected was an atti-
tude command type while in height and yaw a rate command type model was used.
The control equations which provide the commands to the actuators were simple
sums of the differences between the model states and the corresponding air-
craft states. These equations are listed below.
f
Roll
Pitch
Yaw
where
0.56,
0.350 = 8m
0.76T
Model Equations
1.4(2Hm + (2)2*m
1.4(2)9m + (2)26m
3tym - fo.0005UBVB +
«p - «p - «pic
sin $f(u)
Height 10.66C = hm + h,,,
where 6, - 6,1C
The control inputs are in inches, the angles in radians, and h^ is in feet
per second. The function f(u) is a switching term for turn coordinations
above 30 knots.
Control Equations
Roll
Pitch
Yaw
= 8<S. 6<|>m - - 5$
-7.356, 66m - 109 - 1.56m - 46
UTR = 8
24
where
- *IC
Height 16(hm - h) + hm - 4h
The control commands (U^ i, etc.) drive the parallel and series actuators, as
shown on figure 9. Since the series is a position servo and the parallel is a
rate servo, the parallel responds so as to null the control commands and thus
zero (or off-load) the series servo.
Servo Actuators
The autuator complex consists of a series, a parallel and a boost actua-
tor in each axis. The boost is the standard UH-1 hydraulic type. The charac-
teristics, authorities, and rate limits of each of the actuators are given in
table 7.
TABLE 7.- ACTUATOR CHARACTERISTICS
Axis
Roll
Series
Parallel
Boost
Pitch
Series
Parallel
Boost
Yaw
Series
Parallel
Boost
Collective
Series
Parallel
Boost
Authority,3
%
±30
±100
±100
±25
±100
±100
±37
±100
±100
±20
±100
±100
Dynamics
u)0 = 75 r/sec; t, = 0.7
I/T = 40 r/sec
I/T = 50 r/sec
ii
ii
ii
Rate limits, b
deg/sec
±20
±1.37
±20
ii
ii
ii
aComputed based on center to full of actuator over center to
full of control linkage.
"Relative to swash plate motion.
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Figure 9.- V/STOLAND single axis block diagram.
APPENDIX B
FACILITIES
The facilities used for this experiment were the Ames Research Center
six-degree-of-freedom moving-base simulator (S.01), a fixed-base chair cab
simulator (Chair 6), and a Redifon six-degree-of-freedom closed circuit tele-
vision visual flight attachment (VFA-02). The simulation computer used was an
EAI-8400 digital computer having a 32,000 word memory.
S.01 Motion Simulator
The simulator is shown in figure 10. Motion limits for this simulator are
summarized in table 8. Position drive signals were used for all degrees of
freedom. For this simulation, lead compensation was used to improve the fre-
quency response of the system. The frequency response characteristics of the
basic simulator with lead compensation gains for each axis are shown in fig-
ure 11. These characteristics are independent of the motion drive system
logic, or washout, used to keep the simulator within its physical bounds and at
the same time provide the pilot with motion cues representative of the simu-
lated aircraft. The motion drive logic is presented in a separate section
below. The section was provided by Mr. Vernon K. Merrick of FSD Branch whose
contribution is gratefully acknowledged. The data for the basic frequency
response characteristics were obtained by a program called SAFE, documented in
reference 4.
TABLE 8.- SUMMARY OF SIX-DEGREE-OF-FREEDOM (S.01)
SIMULATOR CHARACTERISTICS
Axis
Roll
Pitch
Yaw
Long.
Lateral
Vertical
Displacement
limits (±)
35°
35°
35°
9 ft (2.7 m)
9 ft (2.7 m)
9 ft (2.7 m)
Velocity
limits (±)
1.3 rad/s
1.7 rad/s
3.0 rad/s
9.0 ft/s (2.7 m/s)
8.0 ft/s (2.4 m/s)
7.5 ft/s (2.3 m/s)
Acceleration
limits (±)
10 rad/s2
4.5 rad/s2
3.0 rad/s2
7.5 ft/s2 (2.3 m/s2)
9.2 ft/s2 (2.8 m/s2)
8.8 ft/s2 (2.7 m/s2)
The pilot's panel instruments are shown in figure 12 and described in
table 9. The cab was operated closed, with visual information presented by an
uncollimated black and white TV monitor located above the instrument panel.
Cab controls consisted of pedals, cyclic stick and collective lever, with
force gradients representative of a UH-1B helicopter. Pedal forces were
obtained with bungee cords. A McFadden control loader was used to provide
forces on the cyclic stick. Use of this loader restricted control travels
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Figure 10.- S.01 six-degree-of-freedom motion simulator.
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Figure 12.- Pilot's instrument panel - S.01 cab.
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TABLE 9.- PILOT'S PANEL INSTRUMENTS:
(see fig. 12)
S.01 CAB
1. Indicated airspeed
2. Attitude indicator
3. Altimeter (not present in photo)
4. Turn/bank
5. Rate of climb (IVSI)
6. Failure warning light
slightly below UH-1 values, but the gradient values were maintained. The
collective lever had a manually adjustable friction level. The control travel
and gradient values are summarized in table 10. Static and dynamic friction
levels of the cyclic and pedal controls were not matched with those of the
helicopter, but were considered acceptable by the pilots. The trim system was
identical in function to that provided for Chair 6, described below.
TABLE 10.- CONTROL TRAVEL AND FORCE GRADIENT VALUES: S.01 CAB
Control Gradient,Ib/in. (N/cm)
Travel,
in. (cm)
Longitudinal cyclic
Lateral cyclic
Pedals
Collective
Collective friction
1.06 (1.93)
0.8 (1.A6)
5.8 (10.6)
0
Adjustable approx. 3.7
(16.46)
±6.25 (±15.24)
±5.5 (±13.41)
±3.25 (±7.92)
0-10.45 (0-25.48)
Chair 6 Fixed-Base Simulator
This simulator is shown in figure 13. A framework contains the pilot's
seat; aircraft instrument panel; cyclic, pedal, and collective controls; and a
color TV monitor with collimating lens. Gradients on the pedals and cyclic
controls were provided by spring cartridges with movable ground points. The
trim system duplicated the helicopter's. A force-release button on the cyclic
grip disengaged a magnetic brake allowing the ground points for the spring
cartridges to be moved. Release of the button restored the spring gradients
with zero force at the release position of the controls. Friction level in
the collective lever was adjustable by the pilot. Control travels and force
gradients used were representative of a UH-1B helicopter and are shown in
table 11. Pilot's panel instruments are identified in figure 13 and described
in table 12.
32
Figure 13.- Pilot's instrument panel - Chair 6.
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TABLE 11.- CONTROL TRAVEL AND FORCE GRADIENT VALUES: CHAIR 6 CAB
Control Gradient,
Ib/in. (N/cm)
Travel,
in. (cm)
Longitudinal cyclic
Lateral cyclic
Pedals
Collective
Collective friction
1.0 (1.8)
0.8 (1.46)
5.8 (10.6)
0
Adjustable approx.
(16.46)
3.7
±6.33 (±15.43)
±6.2 (±15.11)
±3.25 (±7.92)
0-12.2 (0-29.75)
TABLE 12.- PILOT'S PANEL INSTRUMENTS:
(see fig. 13)
CHAIR 6 CAB
1. Rotor/engine RPM (NU)
2. Indicated airspeed
3. Attitude indicator
4. Altimeter
5. Torque pressure
NU = Not Used
6. Heading indicator
7. Rate of climb (IVSI)
8. Percent turbine RPM (NU)
9. Turn/bank
10. ILS instrument (NU)
11. Failure warning light
VFA-02 Visual Flight Attachment
This facility consists of scale terrain model scanned by an optical probe
mounted on a movable gantry. Rotation of the probe and its optical elements
duplicate the angular orientation of the simulated aircraft cockpit scene with
respect to the earth, while scaled linear motions of the gantry duplicate air-
craft position. The probe picture is recorded by a 525-line color TV camera.
The field of view at the pilot's eye subtends an arc 36° vertically and 48°
horizontally. Motions of the simulated aircraft calculated by the simulation
computer are used to drive the probe. Linear motions of the optical probe were
scaled at 1:600 with aircraft motions. The motion characteristics for VFA-02
are summarized in table 13.
Motion Drive Logic for S.01
The motion drive logic is designed to convert the calculated motion of the
simulated aircraft into drive signals which move the simulator cab, within its
physical limits, such that the combined effects of cab acceleration and gravity
subject the pilot to forces which are the best approximation to those that he
would experience flying the real aircraft. The "best approximation" is that
which gives the best representation of those forces which provide the pilot
with motion cues and which, therefore, can influence his control of the
aircraft.
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TABLE 13.- SUMMARY OF VISUAL FLIGHT ATTACHMENT (VFA-02) CHARACTERISTICS
Axis
Roll
Pitch
Yaw
Long.a
Lateral3
Verticala
Displacement
limits
100°
+20° , -30°
Unlimited
4 mi. (6.44 km)
±0.5 mi. (0.81km)
750 ft (228.6 m)
Velocity
limits (±)
2 rad/s
3 rad/s
0.333 rad/s
185 knots
180 knots
3300 ft/mm (16.76 m/s)
Acceleration
limits (±)
4.2 rad/s2
16 rad/s2
2 rad/s2
15 g
8.5 g
5.5 g
Frequency
at 30°
phase lag, Hz
1.70
8.50
0.80
0.40
0.56
0.75
At scale 1:600.
The motion drive logic is shown in figures 14 and 15. The inputs are the
calculated aircraft accelerations at the pilot station (Ax>yjZ and A(j))9j1p) and
the actual position of the simulator cab (Apux y z) • The output is the
required cab position (AsD™^  Ago,
 e .). As shown in figures 14 and 15, the
calculated aircraft accelerations at the pilot station are passed through
fourth-order washout filters which strongly attentuate the low frequency com-
ponents, while allowing the high frequency components to pass virtually
unchanged. If the low frequency components of acceleration were passed
unattenuated to the simulator drive system they would quickly cause the cab to
move to its position limits. To recover the motion cues associated with the
low frequency translational accelerations, the cab is rotated (residual tilt)
so that gravity provides components of force, acting on the pilot, which are
roughly equivalent to the calculated low frequency translational inertial
forces. This residual tilt technique can be used only for force compensation
in the horizontal plane and must be accomplished at cab rotational accelera-
tions sufficiently low to be undetectable to the pilot. The residual tilt is
calculated as shown in figure 15 and its degree is controlled through the
parameters o>Ljr and
The cab rotational commands, ASD^J from the motion drive logic contain
some high frequency components which, if uncompensated, would produce false
translational motion cues through the effects of gravity. These spurious
motion cues are removed by cab translational accelerations such that the corre-
sponding inertial forces cancel the unwanted high frequency gravitational
forces but not the low frequency (residual tilt) gravitational forces. This
type of compensation is produced in computations shown at the top of figure 14
and its degree is controlled by the parameters KQJ and KN .
The signals resulting from the calculations described above may still
contain some residual low frequency translational acceleration components. To
ensure that these acceleration components do not cause excessive cab transla-
tion, the translational velocities and positions derived from the accelera-
tions AXS, are passed through second-order washout (high pass) filters shown
in figure 14.
Additional translational position limiting is provided to protect against
inadvertently driving the simulator hard into its stops. For each transla-
tional axis, calculations are performed which continually determine the travel
remaining in the direction of motion of the cab. This distance, the drive
acceleration limits, the computation frame time, and the computed cab velocity
are used to determine whether or not the cab must be given additional decelera-
tion to avoid contact with the stops. Any deceleration command from this
logic is continued until both the commanded acceleration and velocity change
sign. If this additional translation position limiting logic becomes active
during a simulation test it will introduce spurious motion cues.
In setting up the simulation, the parameters of the motion drive logic
are adjusted until the motion cues feel subjectively correct for the type of
aircraft simulated and the type of task to be flown. The motion drive logic
parameters used for the simulation described in this report are given in
table 14.
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TABLE 14.- COEFFICIENT VALUES FOR S.01 SIMULATOR MOTION DRIVE LOGIC
Symbol Value Units
»
 CH z2
KLLX> KLLY
K0y'
AMLX»
AMLX» AMLy> AMLZ
•
 AMLg»
'
 AMLe>
0.4, 0.4
0.4, 0.4
0.4, 0.4
0.5, 0.5
0.4, 0.4
0.25, 0.25
1.4, 1.4
1.4, 1.4
1.4, 1.4
1.4, 1.4
1.4, 1.4
1.4, 1.4
0.5, 0.5, 0.5
0.5, 1.0, 0.5
2.0, 2.0
1.0, 1.0
0.1, 0.1, 0.1
0.707, 0.707, 0.707
0, 1.0, 1.0
1.0, 1.0, 1.0
0.1, 0.1, 0.5
5.6 (1.7), 6.8 (2.1), 5.5 (1.7)
8.5 (2.6), 7.5 (2.3), 7.0 (2.1)
8.0 (2.4), 8.0 (2.4), 8.0 (2.4)
1.2, 1.5, 2.8
0.5326, 0.5326, 0.5326
rad/s
rad/s
rad/s
rad/s
rad/s
rad/s
rad/s
rad/s
ft/s2 (m/s2)
ft/s (m/s)
ft (m)
rad/s
rad
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